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ABSTRACT
In hotly contested product categories dominated by a few
powerful firms, it is quite common for weaker or late en-
trants to focus only on particular segments of the whole
market. The rationale for such strategy is intuitive: to avoid
direct confrontation with heavy-weight firms, and to concen-
trate in segments where these weaker firms have comparative
advantages. In marketing, this is what people called “go
niche or go home”. The niche-building strategy may rely
on “homophily”, which implies that consumers in a partic-
ular market segment might possess certain set of attributes
that cause them to appreciate certain products better (in
other words, weaker firms would customize their products
to target some particular market segments and not the mass
market). On the other hand, the niche-building strategy
may also rely on the network effect, which implies that con-
sumers having social relationship would reinforce each other
via their respective adoptions. In this case, weaker firms
should recognize such inter-customer network and concen-
trate only on customers belonging to certain set of strategic
clusters. In this paper, we present the model for building
effective niche-seeking strategies. For simplicity, we assume
that the adoption choice depends only on the network effects
(in other words, a customer will choose the product that is
chosen by the majority of her neighbor). The social network
is directed, and there will be two firms, one with signifi-
cantly more marketing budget than the other firm. Firms
take turns making investment choices on which customer to
convert. For both firms, their budgets are fixed over time
and unused budget will not carry over to future time pe-
riods. With this model, we manage to show that a simple
strategy based on the evaluation of individual customer’s
“value” can effectively identify and secure niches within ran-
domly generated scale-free networks. We also show that
such niche-building strategy indeed performs better in the
long run than a myopic strategy that only cares about im-
mediate market gains.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Social systems have been shown to be an important fac-
tor in affecting consumption behavioral patterns since the
1960s. The seminal work by Bass [3] marks the dawn of
an era where researchers begin to explore the significance of
networks in explaining or predicting product adoptions or
innovation diffusions. The Bass model is closely related to
the work on network externality in economics (e.g., see [4])
in that it adopts a macroscopic view, investigating adoptions
or diffusions at the industry level. In the Bass model, the
impact of networks is aggregated as the count on previous
adopters, and the future adoption is then a function of this
aggregated count. The simple and elegant Bass model was
later expanded to model adoptions of products with suc-
cessive generations (e.g., high-tech products like DRAM or
consumer electronics) [12] and diffusion process with deci-
sion variables (e.g., price) [13] as well.
With the prevalence of technologies and devices that can
accurately capture the digital traces of an individual (e.g.,
smartphones or social network sites like Facebook) recently,
it becomes increasingly plausible to investigate adoption or
diffusion processes at microscopic level. Now researchers are
able to investigate and infer the micro-structures that are
behind these macro-outcomes instead of fitting the observed
statistics at macro-levels. Such micro-structural insights can
be utilized to explicitly describe ripple effects of adoption or
diffusion among interconnected individuals, and this lead to
the intensive study of cascading phenomenon. In particu-
lar, researchers are studying how one could maximize the
influence/ diffusion/ adoption in a given network through a
targeted set of individuals which is well defined as the influ-
ence maximization problem by [9]. More concretely, given
a directed weighted graph, G =(V,E,W ) with vertices V
as users, edges E as relationships with weight function W:
E→[0,1] which denotes the influence probabilities, the goal
is to select a subset S ⊆ V for initiating the diffusion process
so as to maximize σ(S), the number of vertices influenced
by S at the end of diffusion process. The dynamics of influ-
ence propagation can be represented by one of many existing
models, such as the linear threshold model, general thresh-
old model and utility based model. Most of the propagation
models in literature assume progressive activation in which
an activated node cannot revert back to inactive mode. This
assumption implies that a consumer is unable to change his
choice after an initial purchase, which is rarely practical in
the context of business marketing.
In this paper, we extend the classical influence maximiza-
tion problem by introducing an adversary to the model and
relaxing the assumption on progressive activation. Our re-
search is motivated by an emerging e-Commerce practice
known as influencer marketing, which channels marketing
investment to specific key individuals, known as influencers,
instead of the mass market. The main idea is to generate
substantial awareness and subsequently possible sales from
potential buyers who are strongly connected to these influ-
encers. The influencers serve as conduit to the entire buyer
segment, and are perceived as individuals who shape the
purchasing decisions of true potential buyers. Since all mar-
keters are aware of such phenomena and may deploy similar
practice to compete in the same market, it might eventually
lead marketers to engage the same group of key individuals
in a repeated manner. It is therefore essential from each
marketer’s perspective to design their marketing strategies
(to perform influence maximization) strategically under the
presence of adversary.
In this paper, we narrow our study to a market where two
players (the incumbent/adversary and the entrant) compete
for their respective market shares on a single product. Play-
ers are to take turns making investment decisions (which
particular customer to convert) in their respective decision
epochs. Each player is endowed with a fixed (yet different)
marketing budget at the beginning of each epoch (unused
budget will not carry over), and the decision process will go
on forever. Of particular interest in this paper is the as-
sumption that the adversary is endowed with a higher bud-
get. Due to the fact that the competition goes on forever,
it’s important for players to properly account for their op-
ponent’s future moves. This is where our model departs
from the classical influence maximization problem. An in-
teresting question we would like to answer is whether such
consideration would cause the weaker player (the entrant)
to adopt a niche-seeking strategy.
We model our problem as a two-player influence maxi-
mization problem with infinite horizon. Both the incum-
bent and entrant are assumed to have the information on
the budget of their opponent. Each customer’s decision is
governed by her utility, which comprises network influence
effect and monetary incentives she receives (if any). Further-
more, we introduce a contractual lock-in constraint which
prevents a customer from changing product choice too of-
ten (she cannot change her product choice for a fixed period
after she adopts a new choice). We propose a minimax al-
gorithm that allows players to reason strategically on which
customer to invest in at each time period. The above pro-
cess will continue until some form of steady state is reached.
Instead of seeking immediate gain in market share (what
classical influence maximizer would do), we define a simple
value function to measure the long-term value of each cus-
tomer, and ask entrant to make decision based on this value.
We illustrate empirically that, under certain conditions, our
proposed value-based approach is niche-seeking, which can
indeed secure a larger pool of customers as opposed to con-
ventional count-based (myopic) approach, when competing
against a stronger opponent.
2. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
2.1 Background
The rules of game, players’ role, their decision model and
information sets are define as follow. Our game model is
comprised of non zero-sum, pure strategies repeated sequen-
tial two-players competition game with network influence.
The objectives of both players are to maximize the num-
ber of consumer adopting their respective product/ service
within a network. The structure of consumer markets must
conform to scale-free network phenomenon which is con-
jectured to be good representation for most social network
structure. Both players have complete information of the ply
depth used but incomplete information on the type of node
selection policy used by each other. The incumbent player
perceived his opponent to deploy a simplistic count-based
approach. The role of entrant player is to decide which node
selection policy to deploy for forming the list of consumers
to influence in sequential manner. The game is initialized
with consumers adopting neither product. Then the entrant
will take the lead play to select a consumer (from a pool of
eligible consumers) to instigate persuasive incentive based
on his decision model, and the incumbent will perform the
same subsequently after observing the new game state. The
game will repeat in this manner until either one of the fol-
lowing termination criteria is met. The termination criteria
are, 1) repetition of game state and 2) four hundred game
stage is played with no repetition of game state observed.
Both players are forbade from targeting the same consumer
within a specified game stages. We termed this constraint
as contractual lock-in in this paper.
2.2 Related Work
Network influences are observable dispersion effects which
normally originated from a small local group to larger inter-
connected structure through various means of diffusion. A
phenomena which resulted from network behavioral inter-
action. Research in this area can be broadly classified into
two categories as the influence propagation models, and al-
gorithms to estimate the propagation effects. Here we will
cover only the former which is more relevant to our research.
Granovetter and Schelling [6] were among the first to pro-
pose models that capture the progressive change of nodes in
networks. The concept of linear threshold model proposed
by [6] was based on node-specific thresholds. An inactive
node v at time t-1 will become active (and remain active)
at time t under the following condition:∑
u∈N(v)
wv,uXu,t−1 ≥ Threshold(v) (1)
The variable Xu,t−1 is 1 if u was active at time t-1 and 0
otherwise. The variable wv,u denotes the degree of influence
on v by u (the level of which u being active will contribute
to v being active). Intuitively, if a predetermined fraction
(threshold) of v is less than the sum of degree of influence
from its active neighbors. This model is also known to be
the foundation for a large body of work in the Sociology
domain. Subsequently the Granovetter’s Linear Threshold
model is generalized as general threshold [10] model as it can
be deduced into a re-parameterization form of node v with
monotone activation function fv : 2
v → [0, 1], and activation
threshold θv which is chosen independently, uniformly and
randomly from the interval of (0,1]. A node v will become
active at time t+1 if and only if fv(S) ≥ θv, where S denotes
the set of active nodes at time t. This model is different from
the Linear Threshold model as it focuses on the cumulative
influence of all nodes from a set S instead of the individual
attempts of nodes u ∈ S.
Most relevant to our problem context was the utility function-
based propagation model commonly used to evaluate con-
sumer product selection. Janssen and Jager [7] proposed this
model which incorporated cognitive behavioral theories, to
study the consumer purchasing decision from a psychological
perspective. The authors concluded that the behavioral pro-
cesses which drive the consumers decision are mainly based
upon their needs such as low prices, high social comparison,
and type of cognitive processing that the consumers utilize.
[5] generalized the notion to formulate an utility model to
represent the consumer personal pleasure in consuming a
product. The value in the utility model is derived based on
the consumer’s perception of a product quality, and their
tendency to follow the trends within a localized community.
Here the decision making process of consumers is assumed
to be adversarial and responsive to network externalities, so
a product with the highest utility value will be selected. A
general utility model proposed by [5] is,
Ui = (1− ft)(Qi −Qdes) + ft(Ni/Np). (2)
Ui denotes the amount of pleasure a consumer derives from
product i. The follower tendency of a consumer, ft has a
value in the range of [0,1]. Qi is the consumer’s experienced
quality of product i and has a range value of [0,1]. Here the
consumers are assumed to have a minimum quality require-
ment, Qdes of 0.5 to be satisfied. The number of consumers
who select product i and the total number of consumers are
denoted as Ni and Np respectively.
3. THE MODEL
3.1 Influence Propagation with Investment
We assume that there are two players competing for their
respective market shares in a social network modeled as an
acyclic directed graph. The nodes in the directed graph rep-
resent individuals and links represent relationships among
individuals (since the graph is directed, the impacts are di-
rectional). The two players are to take turns making deci-
sions with infinite decision horizon. At each decision epoch,
the player will be endowed a fixed player-specific budget and
could spend this budget on one of the nodes. As stated ear-
lier, unspent budget cannot be carried over.
To focus on the network effect, we assume that for each
node (customer), her decision depends solely on two factors:
1) the influence from her neighbors, and 2) the direct in-
vestment from any player. Expressed formally, customer n’s
utility value for the product owned by player i in time period
t is:
uti(n) =
∑
m:am,n=1
I{ct−1(m)=i}
|{m′ : am′,n = 1}| +M
t
i (n), (3)
where ct−1(m) represents the choice of node m in time pe-
riod t − 1, am,n denotes the linkage from m to n (1 if such
link exists, 0 otherwise), and this term evaluates the network
influence effects (influence from all neighbors which link to
him) on node n. M ti (n) represents the investment by player
i on node n in time period t. With the above utility function
definition, node n’s choice in time period t is then simply:
ct(n) =
{
arg maxi u
t
i(n), T
t(n) ≥ τ ;
ct−1(n), otherwise.
(4)
Note that in (4), customer n is only allowed to change her
decision if she has maintained a particular choice for more
than τ time periods (T t(n) is the number of time periods
customer n has maintained its current choice). This particu-
lar feature is to emulate the minimum length of contract one
has to sign on when a new product is chosen. This design
also helps to eliminate simple cycles among players (players
keep selecting the most crucial node).
When a new investment is made, or the time period has
progressed (thus changing the value of T t(n)), some nodes
might end up with new product choices, and these changes
will create ripple effects that need to be properly accounted
for. Considering the potential interactions among connected
nodes, we have to propagate these updates using proper or-
der. The procedure is described as follows:
1. Let S be the set containing all nodes.
2. Let R ≡ {n|n ∈ S, am,n = 0, ∀m ∈ S} (in other
words, R is the set of root nodes in S). Let S ← S \R.
3. For n ∈ R, compute uti(n) for i = 1 and 2 following
(3). ct(n) can then be found from (4).
4. If S = ∅, stop, otherwise, go to step 2.
The above procedure always terminates if the graph is acyclic.
3.2 The Node-Selection Problem
With the above influence propagation model, players are
allowed to take turns making decisions on which node to
invest in. Given the complexity of the influence propaga-
tion model described in 3.1, even with perfect information
on {ct(n)} and {T t(n)}, a player has to rely on pure enu-
meration to find the best node to invest in. Note that the
above problem is only with one time period and not consid-
ering adversary. Although it might be possible to formulate
player’s decision making problem with infinite horizon and
adversary, it will be computationally intractable. As such,
when we design player’s strategy, we explicitly define num-
ber of future time periods to be included in the evaluation,
and treat that as a strategy parameter (we call it the look-
ahead time periods).
Although we can make single-player’s strategy tractable
by setting a small-enough look-ahead time periods, such lim-
itation would create some unexpected issue in how we eval-
uate the importance of each node. In most influence max-
imization problems, the importance of a node can be char-
acterized by the number of converts it can bring in through
influence propagation. When adversaries are present and
horizon is infinite, we can still estimate the importance of
a node by using average or discounted measure (commonly
used techniques in infinite horizon decision making prob-
lems) and having appropriate opponent model. Unfortu-
nately, if we artificially limit the number of periods that we
look ahead, these classical approach will not work anymore.
To see this, assume the look-ahead period is just 1, implying
that this player would be myopic. In this case, the strategy
is essentially an influence maximizer that simply chooses the
node that would result in maximum immediate gain; how-
ever, as one would expect, given that there is an adversary,
such gain might be short-lived, and the choice might turn
out to be a short-term gain, long-term loss.
One way to deal with such undesirable side effect of lim-
iting planning horizon is to properly define a value function
that would approximate a node’s true value suppose we are
able to reason with infinite horizon. In our initial study,
we defined one such estimation function, and to distinguish
it from the conventional ways of estimating a node’s value,
we call the strategy that relies on conventional measure the
count-based approach, and the strategy that relies on the
value function the value-based approach.
Formally speaking, the count-based approach is the strat-
egy where player i use the following function to evaluate the
total value for all nodes under his control in time period t:
vti =
∑
n
I{ct(n)=i}. (5)
With (5), the importance value of a particular node m not
owned by i is simply vti(c
t(m) set to 1)− vti .
On the other hand, the value-based approach can take
many different forms. In our study, we use a simple function
that focuses not just on the quantity of nodes under his con-
trol, but also on the strength of the control. Such strength
can be quantified by summing up utilities for nodes that are
controlled by the player i in time t:
vti =
∑
n:ct(n)=i
uti(n)
2. (6)
Similarly, individual node’s value can be computed as in the
count-based case.
To account for the adversary who is effectively competing
for the market share in a zero-sum fashion, we introduce a
minimax procedure to enable players to reason strategically.
Given a state tuple ({ct(n)}, {T t(n)}), the current player
(the maximizing player) will explore all feasible choices, and
for each choice, compute the objective value vti by using ei-
ther Equation (5) or (6) from the state space at number
of look-ahead moves. Now it’s adversary’s turn to make
choice, the assumption is that he will make choice that min-
imizes the maximizing player’s objective value. In general
both players are maximizing their own payoff value calcu-
lated according to their objective function at their number
of look-ahead moves. The number of look-ahead moves al-
lowed will be a player-specific parameter in our model. This
process will continue until we reach one of the termination
criteria.
To improve the performance of the above minimax search
procedure, we apply a standard α-β pruning on the search
tree. The α and β values refer to the lower bound for the
maximizing player and the upper bound for the minimizing
player. All nodes in the search tree that have values lower
than α (for the maximizing player) or higher than β (for the
minimizing player) will be pruned.
4. MODEL EVALUATION
Social influence networks are commonly modeled using a
class of graph structures known as the scale-free networks,
which exhibit high clustering coefficient, small mean short-
est path length properties and power-law degree distribu-
tion. Scale-free networks exhibit higher fraction of nodes
with large (larger than average) number of in-degree edges
connected to them in a network. So networks of any topol-
ogy that comply to the three properties above can be clas-
sified as scale-free model (also known as power-law degree
distribution networks). Kempe et. al. [8] used the Klein-
berg’s Small World network structure as the basis to study
gossip protocols for spreading information in a communica-
tion network. In our experiments, we employed the JGraphT
Java graph library which contain mathematical graph the-
ory objects and algorithm for generating the synthetic scale-
free networks. These networks contain 100 nodes which are
a reasonable size for representing influential social network
with strong ties. According to Adam et. el., procurement
decision of a consumer is influenced mainly by her neighbors
with strong ties, compares to all others [1].
Given the size of our experimental networks, minimax al-
gorithm is employed to evaluate the decision game tree. α-β
pruning heuristic is incorporated in the minimax algorithm
to reduce the size of state space need by pruning decision
branches that prove to be less promising. The computation
effort for α-β approach is upper bounded by the brute force
approach in a complete tree search for each game stage. Our
adversarial search problem is emulated using a simulation
model written in Java. When the size of influence network
is scaled up, the dynamics of our problem will result in an
exponential growth in number of state space. However when
such situation occurs, the sampling-based approaches can be
used to improve the computational efficiency by sacrificing
the comprehensiveness of search.
The following design is used to address our conjecture in
this research. A total of 96 instances are evaluated using
6 sets of distinct network structure. The consumers in the
Table 1: The design of experiments.
Parameter Incumbent Entrant
Node Selection count-based, value-based
Budget Ratio 1 1/3, 1/2
Initial Lock-in null, randomized
Play Sequence first, second
Network Structure 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6
influence networks are initialized under two conditions for
the experiments. When the market players enter an un-
known market space untainted by competition, there is am-
ple amount of opportunity for growth given that all the con-
sumers are yet to be explored. This is synonymous to a
consumer influence network with no initial obligation (con-
tractual lock-in) and every consumer can be targeted by the
players. All the consumers adopt neither product choice at
the initialization of game. Here we refer this condition as
null initial state. On the other hand, the market can al-
ready be hotly contested, and consumers in the network are
all already committed to certain existing obligations with
different remaining lengths. Under this experimental condi-
tion, the game is initialized with each consumer assigned a
random contractual lock-in period.
The stronger player’s budget is set to 1, and the weaker
player is assigned either 1/3 or 1/2. Since the utility func-
tion of a customer for a particular product is determined by
the ratio of her incoming neighbors owning that product,
a budget of 1 implies the stronger player can convert any
customer, while the weaker player can only convert a much
smaller fraction of all customers. To remove first-mover’s
advantage, each player will get to play first for each network
instance.
4.1 Results and Discussions
Given the budget limitation constraint on the entrant player,
we foresee his market share to be lower than the adversary.
However we conjectured that the entrant player could gar-
ner a larger market share simply by changing her node se-
lection policy to consider long-term node values. Using the
synthetic consumer influence networks data, we attested the
effectiveness of the proposed value-based node selection pol-
icy. Without going into details, we would like to illustrate
visually the niche-seeking behavior by our value-based strat-
egy. As illustrated in Figure 1, a cluster is quickly identified
and captured by the entrant player, and such behavior is
consistently observed in the steady state and also for other
network instances. For the rest of the section, we will define
quantitative measures that allow us to quantify the niche-
seeking behaviors.
Figure 1: The effects of value-based approach.
4.1.1 Identifying Set of Steady States
Recall that our model is with infinite horizon, thus the
adoption status might change radically from epoch to epoch.
Therefore, unless this dynamic adoption process comes to a
complete stop (e.g., one player completely dominates the
market), it would be unfair to take any snapshot and con-
clude the performances of player’s strategies.
If complete stop is not observe in a particular experiment
instance, what we can do instead is to identify the repeating
states. According to Section 3.1, the state at time t can be
described by two vectors: {ct(n)} and {T t(n)}. For the pur-
pose of performance evaluation, we only need {ct(n)}. Based
on the above description, at least one state will eventually
appear for the second time, since the set of feasible values
of ct(n) is finite and t is unbounded. Suppose the state in
time t is denoted as St and St = S
′, if S′ is observed again
in time t + δ, the experiment can be terminated early and
the set {St, St+1, . . . , St+δ−1} will contain all the repeating
states of this experiment instance. We can make this claim
because all strategies we proposed are deterministic and not
dependent on {T t(n)}.
This is an important observation, as we can now use the
set of repeating states to quantify player’s performances.
When we report the experiment results, we focus on two
measures: the average and the volatility of market shares
over the set of repeating states. The analysis of experiment
results is presented in the next subsection.
4.1.2 Analysis
The set of steady states defined in the previous subsec-
tion will appear repeatedly and infinitely. Because of this,
a natural way to characterize a player’s performance is to
compute the average market share for all states in the set.
Besides examining averages, we also compute the volatility
of market shares from state to state (in the same repeat-
ing set); such measure allows us to judge the stability and
robustness of a particular player’s strategy as well.
The computation of volatility is inspired by and borrowed
from the financial literature. To illustrate how it’s com-
puted, let {m1,m2, . . . ,mδ} be the sequence of market shares
for a particular player over the set of steady states. We
can first compute the log market share relatives as: ri =
ln(mi+1/mi). The volatility can then be computed by com-
puting the standard deviation of all ri’s.
The above two performance measures under different ex-
periment settings (combination of null and random initial-
ization and budget ratio of 1/3 and 1/2) are presented in
Table 2.
Table 2: Summary of experiment results (CB and
VB stand for count- and value-based respectively).
# of Adopters (std. dev.)
Adversary Strategy Volatility
CB VB (against CB)
n
u
ll
1
3
CB 45.2 (0.015) 24.3 (0.036) 0.0625
VB 67.8 (0.031) 45.1 (0.023) 0.0335
1
2
CB 46.3 (0.018) 25.5 (0.039) 0.0761
VB 69.1 (0.027) 45.7 (0.021) 0.0337
ra
n
d
o
m 1
3
CB 30.8 (0.027) 17.8 (0.028) 0.0170
VB 40.9 (0.019) 28.0 (0.031) 0.0232
1
2
CB 32.0 (0.021) 23.1 (0.023) 0.0130
VB 44.4 (0.030) 30.8 (0.037) 0.0191
There are two important insights we can draw from the
results presented in Table 2:
• For the entrant player, it’s always better to adopt the
value-based strategy. By simply adopting value-based
strategy (which consider a node’s long-term value), the
entrant can perform considerably better than the my-
opic count-based strategy by more than 50% in all
cases.
• For the incumbent player, it’s also beneficial to adopt
the value-based strategy. For all setups, the incumbent
performs significantly better if he uses value-based strat-
egy. Moreover, when the network is initialized with
null status, we can see that the incumbent player per-
forms worse than the value-based entrant player if he
adopts count-based strategy. This is so for both en-
trant player’s budget levels (1/2 and 1/3).
The above two observations from the experiment results
strongly support our conjecture that to succeed in a com-
petitive influence maximization game with infinite horizon,
it’s very important to evaluate a node’s long-term value cor-
rectly. Although our value function is extremely simple,
it’s still significantly better than the conventional approach
that just myopically maximize immediate market gains. In
terms of volatility, we can see that against a count-based ad-
versary in a null initialization, the entrant will enter a much
stable steady state if he chooses the value-based approach.
However, such difference diminishes when the initialization
becomes random.
4.1.3 Niche Performance Metric
In the previous subsection, we show that value-based strat-
egy performs better than the count-based approach under all
circumstances and for both entrant and incumbent players.
To find out whether such value-based strategy would result
in players building niche customer base, we define a niche
performance metric to measure the degree of niche seeking.
This metric calculates the proportion of edges where both
the source and target nodes adopt the same product type
over total number of edges. When the source and target
nodes are adopting the same product type, it implies an in-
fluence propagation effect from the source to target node.
On the contrarily, when the source and target node’s prod-
uct type is different from each other, it symbolizes a non-
continuity in influence spread.
In our experiments, we observed that regardless of setups,
the value-based approach always ends up with higher niche
performance metric in steady states. For the null initial-
ization, the comparison is summarized in Table 3. For the
random initialization, the comparison is summarized in Ta-
ble 4.
These experiment results confirm our second conjecture:
it’s indeed more advantageous for weaker player to concen-
trate on smaller niche in the scale-free networks.
Table 3: Niche performance metric under null ini-
tialization.
Fraction of Adversary’s Budget
1/3 1/2
CB VB CB VB
Average 0.425 0.711 0.443 0.718
Std. dev. 0.019 0.033 0.024 0.038
Table 4: Niche performance metric under random
initialization.
Fraction of Adversary’s Budget
1/3 1/2
CB VB CB VB
Average 0.247 0.365 0.262 0.388
Std. dev. 0.038 0.054 0.023 0.046
5. CONCLUSIONS
Influence maximization is a well-studied problem in the
literature. It captures researchers’ attention recently due
to the fact that societal-scale social networks are increas-
ingly ubiquitous. However, the classical research on influ-
ence maximization lacks either the explicit modeling of ad-
versaries or the consideration of time.
In this paper, we construct a simple two-player, infinite
horizon influence maximization model to illustrate the im-
portance of considering both adversary and time. The count-
based approach, which represents the conventional influence
maximization approach, is shown to perform much worse
than the value-based approach, which approximate the long-
term values of individual nodes. Furthermore, we show that
the value-based approach achieves the better performance
via niche-seeking, which is measured using our niche perfor-
mance metric.
Our model provides a simple and clean framework for
future study on extending well-known results on influence
maximization to real-world marketing problems.
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